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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Abdon Saenz contends that, in his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor impermissibly argued
facts not in evidence - that "I had listened to hours of interviews," "I read all the police reports
and watched all the videos" - and argued, based on all those extraneous facts, that the jury
should reject Mr. Saenz's alternative-perpetrator defense because no one else ever corroborated
his alternative-perpetrator theory.

(Tr., p.612, Ls.9-17.)

He also contends the prosecutor

misrepresented the facts, taking a statement he made out of context and arguing that was a
confession even though his statement, in context, was a denial.
Since the prosecutor's misconduct in this regard went directly to the contested issue in
this case, it was prejudicial and amounts to fundamental error. Therefore, this Court should
vacate Mr. Saenz's conviction and remand this case for a fair trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officer Duin, who began the investigation around 12:30 in the morning, testified he had
been told two men, each of whom was holding a glass in hand, had attacked the victim, Matthew
Wise. (Tr., p.361, Ls.10-19.) Mr. Wise had been injured when he was hit in the face with a
glass, causing, among other things, several large cuts when the glass broke. (See Tr., p.186, L.18
- p.187, L.1; Exhibit 9.) 1
Based on a witness identification, Detective Damon Rice went to interview Mr. Saenz
two days after the incident. (See Tr., p.407, Ls.7-15, p.429, Ls.12-16.) During that interview,
Mr. Saenz allowed Detective Rice to look at his hands, and the detective saw no marks, cuts,

1

For consistency between references to the printed exhibits and the audio/video exhibits, all
references to the exhibits will be to their exhibit number.
1

bruising, or swelling on Mr. Saenz's hands. (Tr., p.419, Ls.23-25.) Detective Rice testified that
Mr. Saenz was forthcoming with potential evidence, such as the shirt he had been wearing that
night, during the interview and he did not appear to be trying to obstruct the investigation.
(Tr., p.421, Ls.17-19; see generally Exhibit 27.)
The officer was not able to identify the other man, Rudolfo Reyes, until sometime later.
(See Tr., p.412, Ls.9-14.) Ultimately, seventeen days after the incident, he was able to interview

Mr. Reyes, and at that time, his hands were not marked either. (Tr., p.423, L.25 - p.424, L.2;
compare Tr., p.517, Ls.22-23 (the district court instructing the jury that the first interview with

Mr. Reyes occurred on August 9, 2017); with R., p.45 (the information alleging the incident
occurred on July 23, 2017).)
Mr. Wise and another witness, Ken Adams, gave more information about what they had
seen during that incident. However, Officer Duin testified it was dark in the area where the
incident had occurred. (Tr., p.357, L.15 - p.358, L.1.) In fact, even though the headlights from
emergency vehicles were pointing in that direction, he still needed a flashlight to see and identify
objects in the area. 2 (See Exhibit 38 (digital copies of Exhibits 14-19); Exhibit 23 (the video
from Officer Duin' s body camera, showing how close the officer had to be to make out people,
even with the headlights pointing toward the area).)

2

Mr. Wise noted that the area around the door to the bar is illuminated by a street light as well as
lights built into the awning. (Tr., p.203, Ls.1-13; see Exhibit 1 (showing the area outside the
door).) However, as Mr. Adams noted, the incident occurred on the far side of this truck, which
was parked approximately three spaces away from the handicap space near the door. (Tr., p.232,
Ls.12-18; see Exhibit 5 (overhead view of the bar and parking area).)
2

Nevertheless, Mr. Adams testified that, though he was standing at the handicap spot some
twenty feet away (Tr., p.231, Ls.11-24, p.233, Ls.20-23), 3 he was able to see Mr. Saenz,4 who
was standing at the driver's side door of their car, throw a glass at Mr. Wise, then run up and hit
him with another glass. (Tr., p.236, Ls.1-19.) Contrary to the initial report to Officer Duin,
Mr. Adams testified that Mr. Reyes had not been involved in the assault, but had, instead, simply
stood on the other side of his car. (Tr., p.255, Ls.9-13.) For his part, Mr. Wise testified that he
ducked when Mr. Saenz threw the glass and as he raised his head, he was hit in the face, but he
testified that, "for a split second" before he was hit, he was able to see it was Mr. Saenz who hit
him. (Tr., p.178, L.16 - p.179, L.14.)
Mr. Saenz acknowledged there had been a second encounter outside the bar, but, in his
second interview with the detective, said: "He came at me -- I don't know if he came at me. I
don't know, I don't remember his aggression or anything. But, um, you know, I don't know, like
I said, I don't remember hitting him." 5 (See Exhibit 28, ~0:50; see also Exhibit 27, ~6:42
(Mr. Saenz admitting if there was a "squabble," he may have hit someone with his hand, but
would not have used a glass).)
However, Mr. Reyes and his wife said they were away from the car when the bartender
rushed past them. 6 (Exhibit 36, ~2:45; Exhibit 37, ~2:20.) They told the officer they did not see

3

When he resumed his testimony on the second day of trial, Mr. Adams explained he was twenty
feet away when the incident began, and walked forward some five to ten feet when Mr. Wise
went to the ground. (See Tr., p.305, L.21 - p.306, L.11.)
4
Mr. Adams was actually unable to identify Mr. Saenz in a photo lineup. (See Exhibit 12;
Tr., p.566, Ls.17-22 (the prosecutor acknowledging the misidentification).)
5
Quotations from the audio and video exhibits are transcribed to the best of appellate counsel's
ability.
6
Mr. Reyes and his wife were ultimately ''unavailable" to testify at trial. (See Tr., p.517,
Ls.16-19.) Though the jury was not informed of the fact, defense counsel represented that he
had been trying to serve subpoenas on them, but they were actively avoiding the service agent.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.14-20.) He also indicated they had been initially subpoenaed by the prosecutor and
3

anything that happened during the actual incident.

(Exhibit 36, ~ 14:20)

Nevertheless,

Mr. Reyes actively tried to block other people on scene from taking pictures of his license plate
as he and his wife went to leave. (Tr., p.257, Ls.12-15.) He also told the investigator that
Mr. Saenz got into their car with them as they were leaving, and, though they had no real
connection to Mr. Saenz, still drove to the next block before telling him to get out. (Exhibit 36,
~1:25.)
Mr. Adams also testified that he had stayed at the bar that evening because of an incident
earlier in the evening.

(Tr., p.228, Ls.14-19; see Tr., p.153, Ls.5-19 (Mr. Wise explaining

Mr. Adams is a regular patron of the bar, and he helps out sometimes, including as a bouncer or
doorman).) Specifically, that incident began when Mr. Adams saw Mr. Saenz with a glass of
beer standing outside the bar. (See Tr., p.219, Ls.3-24.) Since that is not permitted at this
establishment, he told Mr. Wise, who went outside to deal with the situation.

(Tr., p.154,

Ls.17-25, p.220, Ls.8-9.)
Mr. Wise told Mr. Saenz he could not drink outside and took the glass. (Tr., p.156,
L.15 - p.157, L.9.) Mr. Saenz came back inside and confronted Mr. Wise, and the two had an
animated discussion. 7 (Exhibit 6, ~22:58:23.) 8 Mr. Saenz explained that he felt disrespected by
the way Mr. Wise had handled the situation. (Tr., p.163, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Reyes joined Mr. Saenz
during that discussion.

(Exhibit 6, ~22:59:13.)

However, after a few minutes, Mr. Saenz

apologized, he and Mr. Wise shook hands, and Mr. Wise continued to serve him. (Exhibit 6,

told they still needed to come back in. (Tr., p.16, Ls.20-24.) However, by stipulation, two
interviews with Mr. Reyes and his wife, one by the detective and one by the prosecutor's
investigator, were played for the jury. (Tr., p.517, Ls.16-19; Exhibits 36 and 37.)
7
While there is no audio accompanying the security camera video, its shows both Mr. Wise and
Mr. Saenz making several hand gestures during their conversation. (See Exhibit 6, ~16:25.)
8
When the parties referred to the security video in Exhibit 6, they used the time stamp from the
video itself For consistency, Mr. Saenz will do so on appeal as well.
4

~23:01:15; Tr., p.164, Ls.14-16.) Mr. Wise testified he felt that incident was fully resolved at
that point. (Tr., p.164, Ls.11-13.) Mr. Saenz began talking and laughing with other bar patrons.
(Tr., p.228, Ls.5-11; see generally Exhibit 6.) However, Mr. Adams noticed Mr. Reyes continue
to throw angry looks at Mr. Wise, and that made him uneasy. (Tr., p.227, L.20 - p.228, L.13
(noting he was also uneasy because Mr. Saenz was laughing about the incident).)
The State ultimately charged Mr. Saenz with aggravated battery for hitting Mr. Wise with
the glass. (R., pp.44-45; see Tr., p.523, L.16 - p.524, L.4 (the prosecutor noting the specificity
with which the Information identified the charged act).) Mr. Saenz's theory at trial was that
Mr. Reyes had actually been the one to hit Mr. Wise in the face with the glass. 9 (See generally
Tr.)
In his initial closing, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Saenz made statements in the second
interview (Exhibit 28), and "I'm going to call it an admission."

(Tr., p.570, Ls.15-17.)

Specifically, the prosecutor argued that Mr. Saenz said "[h]e came at me." (Tr., p.571, Ls.8-9;
compare Exhibit 28, ~0:50 (Mr. Saenz saying "He came at me -- I don't know if he came at me.
I don't know, I don't remember his aggression or anything.").)

The prosecutor continued:

"You'll notice he doesn't say that he came at [Mr. Reyes] or he came at [Mr. Reyes' wife] or I
saw him approach someone else. No. He came at me. Whoa. He just messed up. He just
confirmed everything we've been trying to argue about whether the defendant and Matt came
together during the second encounter." (Tr., p.571, Ls.18-25.) Defense counsel proceeded to
point out numerous inconsistencies in the evidence the State presented, arguing each contributed

9

Mr. Saenz's left thumbprint was found upside down on the bottom portion of the glass that had
been thrown at Mr. Wise. (Tr., p.475, L.17 - p.477, L.3; Tr., p.493, Lsl-6.) However, as the
forensic analyst testified, that did not mean he was the only person to have touched that glass, or
that he was the last person to have touched that glass. (Tr., p.494, L.17 - p.495, L.8.)
5

a reasonable doubt to the case. (See generally Tr., pp.576-612.) The prosecutor then gave the
following, short rebuttal:
I was sitting in my office, and I had listened to hours of interviews. I had
tried to describe the details of what people said. I read all the police reports and
watched all the videos. And I was sitting there with all of these facts bouncing
around in my head. And the thought occurred to me: Is there one person, one
person who says the defendant wasn't there? The defendant didn't do this. Or it
was somebody else. Not one.
And so, I listen to the defense go through some of those same facts, I
come back with the very same thing. Not one person says the defendant didn't do
this. Or he wasn't there. Or identifies somebody else as doing this. Just him.
The person who admits to [Mr. Reyes] that he was pissed about the way he was
treated. And the person who slips up and admits there was a second encounter
when I was leaving and [Mr. Wise] came at me. The person with the beer glasses.
Not that he came with someone else. No that he came with [Mr. Reyes]. He
came at me. And when you have that, you have one person. And I'm asking you
to fmd him guilty.
(Tr., p.612, Ls.9-17.) While the officers had testified about aspects of their investigation, the
police reports had not been admitted during the trial. (See generally Tr.) The recordings of the
interviews which were admitted as exhibits at trial had a total run time of thirty-eight minutes.

(See Exhibits 27, 28, 36, 37.) The video from the officer's body camera was heavily redacted,
such that the exhibit presented a short montage of video clips. (See generally Exhibit 23.)
The jurors deliberated for three hours before returning a verdict fmding Mr. Saenz guilty
of aggravated battery.

(R., pp.102, 134-35.)

The district court subsequently imposed and

executed a ten-year sentence, with three years fixed on Mr. Saenz. (Tr., p.651, Ls.15-16.) He
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.160, 162.)

6

ISSUE
Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error by arguing in his
rebuttal closing that the jury should reject Mr. Saenz's theory of the case based on
misrepresentations of facts and on facts that were not admitted as evidence.

7

ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error By Arguing In His
Rebuttal Closing That The Jury Should Reject Mr. Saenz's Theory Of The Case Based On
Misrepresentations Of The Facts And On Facts That Were Not Admitted As Evidence

A.

Standard Of Review
When an error has not been contemporaneously objected to below, it will only be

reviewed on appeal if it constitutes fundamental error.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226

(2010). An error is fundamental if it infringed on an unwaived constitutional right, is clear from
the face of the record, and affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226; see State v. Miller,
P.3d _ , 2019 WL 1217673, at *2 (Mar. 15, 2019) (clarifying that, to be clear from the record,
the record needs to show the failure to object was not for strategic reasons, and that, to show
prejudice, the record needs to show the error actually affected the outcome, not just a reasonable
possibility that it did), petition for reh 'g filed.

B.

Prosecutorial Misconduct By Misrepresenting Facts And Arguing Facts Not In Evidence
Infringes On The Defendant's Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial
Idaho's courts have made it clear that "it was misconduct for the prosecutor to refer to

evidence that was not admitted in an attempt to imply to the jury what that evidence would have
been." State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525 (Ct. App. 2001); accord State v. Griffiths, 101
Idaho 163, 166 (1980), overruled on other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396
(1981); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 566
(Ct. App. 2001).

Likewise, it is clearly misconduct for the prosecutor to misrepresent the

evidence on a particular point.

State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904, 911-12 (Ct. App. 2010);

State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 575 (Ct. App. 2007).

8

Both these types of misconduct qualify as constitutional violations under the first prong
of the fundamental error test because, "'where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any
factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts the
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial."' State v. Branigh, 155 Idaho 404, 418
(Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227)). Here, the prosecutor managed to do both in
his two-paragraph rebuttal closing.
First, he expressly argued the jury should reject Mr. Saenz's defense theory based on
facts not in evidence. He specifically told the jurors he had "listened to hours of interviews," but
only thirty-eight minutes of interviews were admitted in the trial exhibits. (Tr., p.612, Ls.9-10;

compare Exhibits 27, 28, 36, 37); He told the jurors he had read "all the police reports," and
none of those were admitted at trial. (Tr., p.612, Ls.11-12; compare generally Tr.) In fact, the
prosecutor cannot admit them by rule. I.R.E. 803(8)(A)(ii)(B). He said he had watched "all the
videos," when some, such as the video from Officer Duin's body camera, were only admitted
after it had been heavily redacted. 10 (Tr., p.612, L.12 (emphasis added); compare Exhibit 23.)
Moreover, he was trying to convey to the jurors what those other, un-admitted facts would have
shown - that no one corroborated Mr. Saenz's alternative-perpetrator theory.

(Tr., p.612,

Ls.15-17.) That is precisely what the Martinez Court held a prosecutor cannot do. Martinez, 136
Idaho at 525.

10

There is no indication in the record as to whether there were other videos, such as other
cameras around the area, or from officers' body camera videos, dash camera videos from the
police cars on scene. However, the prosecutor's argument certainly suggests there might have
been, and the jurors should convict based on what they might have shown.

9

Second, the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence from Exhibit 28 when he said that
Mr. Saenz “confessed” that Mr. Wise “came at him” because that blatantly ignores the other half
of Mr. Saenz’s statement at that moment. (See Tr., p.612, L.24 - p.614, L.5; see also Tr., p.571,
Ls.18-25.) What Mr. Saenz actually said was: “He came at me -- I don’t know if he came at me.
I don’t know, I don’t remember his aggression or anything.” (Exhibit 28, ~0:50 (emphasis
added).) Thus, Mr. Saenz made it clear that first part of the statement was not accurate.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument in this regard was not constitute a fair inference from the
evidence because it was directly contrary to Mr. Saenz’s actual assertion – that “I don’t know if
he came at me.”
The Court of Appeals addressed as similar closing argument in Beebe and held it was
improper. Beebe, 145 Idaho at 574-75. In that case, the defendant made statements indicating
that he had entered the store in question and demanded money, but the prosecutor cast those
statements as repeated, persistent, and consistent confessions to not just enter the store with the
intent to take the money, but also to having the disputed intent to use force to take the money.
Id. at 574. The Court of Appeals held that this distinction, though subtle, was still not a fair
portrayal of the statements the defendant had actually made. Id. Moreover, by proceeding to
emphasize that misconstrued version of the defendant’s statements as the basis on which the jury
should find the disputed element (whether he intended to use force) only highlighted the
misconduct. Id. at 574-75. So, too, the prosecutor’s arguments in this case misconstrued the
nature of Mr. Saenz’s statements, and placed improper emphasis on the misconstrued facts as a
confession which Mr. Saenz did not actually make regarding the disputed element. Therefore,
that argument, like the argument in Beebe, constituted misconduct.
Thus, as in Branigh, both instances of misconduct satisfy the first prong of the Perry test.

10

C.

The Error In This Regard Is Clear And Obvious From The Face Of The Record
In Branigh, the Court of Appeals held that, since the transcript of the prosecutor's

arguments showed he was actually referring to evidence that had not been admitted, he "has also
shown that the error plainly exists," and so, satisfied the second prong of Perry. Branigh, 155
Idaho at 418. It reached that conclusion even with Perry's requirement that the record show
there was no strategic reason behind trial counsel's failure to object. See id.; compare Perry, 150
Idaho at 226.
The same is true in Mr. Saenz's case - the transcript of the prosecutor's argument shows
he was actually referring to evidence that had not been admitted and that he was misrepresenting
the statements contained in Exhibit 28. The record also shows the failure to object was not
tactical, particularly in regard to the arguments in the prosecutor's rebuttal closing, since there
was no other means by which defense counsel could have tried to address that misconduct.
Compare Perry, 150 Idaho at 226 n.5 (using State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009), as

an example of when an error would not be clear due to a tactical reason - in Adams, defense
counsel had sought to rehabilitate a potentially-biased juror rather than move to strike that juror
for cause, meaning the failure to strike that juror could not be clear fundamental error).
Additionally, Mr. Saenz's defense at trial was based on arguments that the evidence did
not support his conviction, and he did not confess, because someone else was the actual batterer.
As such, the record shows trial counsel was not exercising a strategy to not object so as not to
draw attention to a minor or tangential point lost in the middle of a drawn-out closing. The
prosecutor's misconduct went to the heart of the defense strategy and was the last thing the jury
heard, which means it was the thing the jurors were most likely to remember.
Branigh, both instances of misconduct satisfy the second prong of the Perry test.

11

Thus, as in

D.

The Misconduct Affected The Verdict Because The Prosecutor Argued The Un-Admitted
Evidence To Corroborate The State's Theory On The Central Issue In Dispute When The
Admitted Evidence Was Subject To Several Reasonable Doubts
It is on this third prong of the analysis that Mr. Saenz's case differs from Branigh. In

Branigh, the facts to which the prosecutor had inappropriately referred were the reasons why the
state lab no longer tested for gunshot residue. Branigh, 155 Idaho at 417. The Court of Appeals
concluded those facts did not contribute to the verdict because they only undermined the quality
of the investigation, but did nothing to undermine the testimony given by the eyewitnesses. See

Branigh, 155 Idaho at 418-19 (recounting the detailed testimony of the eyewitnesses in that
case). Nor did the improperly-referenced facts address the "most damning" evidence against the
defendant in that case - the ominous text messages he had sent to the victims earlier in the day.

Id. at 419. In other words, since the misconduct in that case only spoke to a tangential issue, and
not the core question of the defendant's guilt, the Branigh Court held the error did not affect the
outcome. See id.
In Mr. Saenz's case, however, the misconduct went directly to the core question in this
case, and the prosecutor specifically used it to convince the jurors' decision on the critical
question.

Cf Beebe, 145 Idaho at 576 (finding similar misconduct (which was admittedly

objected to) to be not harmless because the prosecutor used it to try and sway the jury on the
central disputed issue). In this case, there were several points on which the jurors may have had
reasonable doubts as to whether Mr. Reyes, and not Mr. Saenz, was the actual batterer. For
example, the uncontradicted testimony was that Mr. Reyes, not Mr. Saenz, had continued to
shoot angry looks at Mr. Wise after the first incident. (Tr., p.227, L.25 - p.228, L.1.) Mr. Saenz,
on the other hand, had shaken hands with the bartender and moved on with his evening, laughing
and chatting with the other people in the bar. (Tr., p.164, Ls.11-16 (Mr. Wise testifying that he

12

felt the issue with Mr. Saenz had been fully resolved at that point); see Exhibit 6, ~23:01:15.)
Moreover, despite his assertion that he had no ties to Mr. Saenz, Mr. Reyes waited to tell
Mr. Saenz, who had supposedly just assaulted someone, to get out of his car until getting to the
next block. (See Exhibit 36, ~1:25.)
The uncontradicted evidence also showed that it was Mr. Reyes who was trying to thwart
the investigation by actively preventing by-standers from taking pictures of his car and license
plate. (Tr., p.257, Ls.12-15.) It was also Mr. Reyes who was unavailable to testify at the trial.
(Tr., p.517, Ls.16-19.)
The testimony from Mr. Adams and Mr. Wise was also susceptible to reasonable doubt
because they did not have good opportunities to see who the batterer actually was. For example,
Mr. Adams put himself twenty feet away when that attack happened on the other side of several
cars in an area so dark that, even with headlights pointing into the area, it was difficult to see
people’s features unless standing right next to them. (Tr., Tr., p.231, Ls.11-24, p.233, Ls.20-23;
see Exhibit 23 (the officer’s body camera video).) Mr. Wise, who was also in that dark area,
admitted he only had a split second between raising his head after the first glass was thrown and
the second glass hit him to see who the assailant might have been. (Tr., p.178, L.16 - p.179,
L.14.) There had also been time for Mr. Saenz to pass one of the glasses to Mr. Reyes, and for
both Mr. Adams and Mr. Wise to have missed it in the dark. (See Tr., p.582, Ls.14-19 (defense
counsel discussing the timeline); compare Exhibits 14-18 (showing the officers needing
flashlights and car headlights to see the glasses in that area).)
The physical evidence also cast reasonable doubts on the State’s theory. For example,
Mr. Saenz did not have time for any injuries on his hands to heal before the officer inspected
them. (Tr., p.419, Ls.23-25.) That is telling because this incident involved a significant amount

13

of broken glass. (See Exhibit 9 (showing the cuts to Mr. Wise's face as the result of that glass).)
Mr. Reyes, on the other hand, had seventeen days in which his hands could have healed before
officers examined them. (Tr., p.423, L.25 - p.424, L.2.)
But, the prosecutor said in his improper rebuttal arguments, the jurors should not worry
about any of those issues because the prosecutor had "listened to hours of interviews," had "read
all the police reports and watched all the videos," and no one in all those other aspects of the
investigation, according to the prosecutor, said anybody but Mr. Saenz was the assailant.
(Tr., p.612, Ls.9-17.) That misconduct affected the verdict because it told the jurors there was
other evidence which reinforced the State's views, and so, while there may be holes in the trial
evidence, they should still convict Mr. Saenz. See State v. Villanueva, 2016 WL 756935, *3
(Ct. App. 2016) (holding that misconduct in arguing facts not in evidence satisfied the third
prong of Perry when the prosecutor tried to use those extraneous facts to try to sway the jurors'
credibility determinations in regard to the central issue in the case), unpublished. 11
The prosecutor also argued the jurors should disregard those reasonable doubts because,
the prosecutor misstated, Mr. Saenz had confessed the central contested point.

(Tr., p.612,

L.24 - p.614, L.5; see also Tr., p.571, Ls.18-25.) As the Court of Appeals indicated in Beebe,
misconstruing evidence to serve as a confession regarding the central point of dispute, even
though such a confession was not actually made, would contribute to the verdict. Beebe 145

11

Mr. Saenz recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he does not
cite Villanueva as authority requiring a particular decision in this case. Rather, he merely
references them as historical examples of how a learned court has addressed a similar issue.
Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting
Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider
unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his
petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].'
Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding
precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
14

Idaho at 576. The same is true here, especially where the jury was clearly discussing something
during its three-hour deliberation. (See R., p.102.)
Since both instances of misconduct went directly to the core issue in this case, they both
satisfy the third prong of the Perry test. Therefore, it constitutes reversible fundamental error.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Saenz respectfully requests this Court vacate the verdict and judgment of conviction
in this case and remand it for a fair trial.
DATED this 26 th day of April, 2019.
/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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